Eller rättare sagt så har en del av Skype-protokollet reverse-engineerats. Det är den del av Skype som använder RC4-algoritmer och varianter på denna. Följande framgår av källkoden:

|*| Skype Library RC4 v1.109 by Sean O’Neil.
|*| Copyright (c) 2004-2010 VEST Corporation.
|*| All rights reserved.
|*| Not for commercial use.
|*|
|*| We are reverse engineers.
|*| We can prove if you have used this code in your product.
|*| We will find you.
|*| We will prosecute for copyright infringement.
|*| This code is quite unique and is easily identifiable.
|*| Result may match Skype’s 100%, but this code is ours.
|*| The computation is significantly different from Skype’s.
|*|
|*| For academic research and educational purposes only.
|*| If you require Skype compatibility in your products,
|*| feel free to contact Sean O’Neil on www.enrupt.com
|*|
|*| Last changes: 09.07.2009 (a minor correction from 1.108 that does not affect its use in Skype-compatible projects)
|*| Published: 07.07.2010
|*| More will be published at 27C3, December 2010 (http://www.ccc.de/en/calendar)

Som hittas här: cryptolib.com/ciphers/skype/

Sean O’Neil har även skrivit ett antal förtydliganden på sin blogg där han bl.a. skriver att detta inte påverkar säkerheten i Skype eftersom tal, filöverföringar etc. är krypterade med AES 256-bit nycklar,  1024-bit RSA algoritm samt autentiserade med a 2048-bit RSA-nycklar. Källkoden som han har släppt hanterar enbart kommunikation mellan Skype-klienten och dess noder.

Följ oss på Twitter: http://twitter.com/kryptera

Nu har RSA med 768-bitar faktoriserats av ett antal forskare.

Factorization of a 768-bit RSA modulus

Thorsten Kleinjung and Kazumaro Aoki and Jens Franke and Arjen Lenstra and Emmanuel Thomé and Joppe Bos and Pierrick Gaudry and Alexander Kruppa and Peter Montgomery and Dag Arne Osvik and Herman te Riele and Andrey Timofeev and Paul Zimmermann

Abstract: This paper reports on the factorization of the 768-bit number RSA-768 by the number field sieve factoring method and discusses some implications for RSA.

Du hittar deras uppsats här:

http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/006

Intressant är följande citat:

Factoring a 1024-bit RSA modulus would be about a thousand times harder, and a 768-bit RSA modulus is several thousands times harder to factor than a 512-bit one.

Because the first factorization of a 512-bit RSA modulus was reported only a decade ago (cf. [7]) it is not unreasonable to expect that 1024-bit RSA moduli can be factored well within the next decade by an academic effort such as ours or the one in [7]. Thus, it would be prudent to phase out usage of 1024-bit RSA within the next three to four years.

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Kryptogurun Nate Lawson gav en presentation (PDF) under konferensen RSA 2008 om hur du designar samt attackerar DRM system.

Nate jämför Blu-ray, AACS vs. BD+. Samt nämner lite om AACS MKBv7 som Slysoft tydligen knäckt:

AnyDVD (HD) 6.4.1.1 2008 04 10
- New (Blu-ray): Added support for AACS MKBv7!
(used on new titles to be released end of April)
- New (Blu-ray): Complete region lock removal from Blu-ray disc,
including discs which contain signed Java code!
- New (Blu-ray): Added dialog to ask for disc region on insertion.
- New (Blu-ray): Automatic option remembers previous region settings
per disc
- New (DVD): Support for protection on ”Reservation Road”, US
- New (DVD): Many improvements to AI scanner and AnyDVD ripper
- Fix (Blu-ray): BD+ removal did not work with some discs.

Följ oss på Twitter: http://twitter.com/kryptera