Renegotiating TLS

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Summary

Transport Layer Security (TLS, RFC 5246 and previous, including SSL v3 and previous) is subject to a number of serious man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks related to renegotiation. In general, these problems allow an MITM to inject an arbitrary amount of chosen plaintext into the beginning of the application protocol stream, leading to a variety of abuse possibilities. In particular, practical attacks against HTTPS client certificate authentication have been demonstrated against recent versions of both Microsoft IIS and Apache httpd on a variety of platforms and in conjunction with a variety of client applications. Cases not involving client certificates have been demonstrated as well. Although this research has focused on the implications specifically for HTTP as the application protocol, the research is ongoing and many of these attacks are expected to generalize well to other protocols layered on TLS.

There are three general attacks against HTTPS discussed here, each with slightly different characteristics, all of which yield the same result: the attacker is able to execute an HTTP transaction of his choice, authenticated by a legitimate user (the victim of the MITM attack). Some attacks result in the attacker-supplied request generating a response document which is then presented to the client without any certificate warning or other indication to the user. Other techniques allow the attacker to forward or re-purpose client certificate authentication credentials.

Technology Background

TLS is a widely used protocol, but there are a number of features (standardized and otherwise) that are inconsistently implemented and used. Following is a brief summary of TLS negotiation, and an explanation of two relevant features of the protocol.

Basic TLS begins negotiation with a Client Hello message sent by the client to the server, including the list of supported cipher suites. The server responds with a Server Hello, selecting an appropriate TLS version and cipher suite to use in the initial TLS session. The server also responds with its certificate, and finishes with a Server Hello Done. The client then establishes an encryption key, each side sends a Change Cipher Spec message to activate encryption, and each sends a Finished request to its peer.
There are a number of variations on this theme, but this is the common case.

At this point, bi-directional encryption has been negotiated, and future messages (including control messages) are encrypted between the peers.

The standard permits either end to request renegotiation of the TLS session at any time. The ostensible reason for this is to allow either end to decide that it would like to refresh its cryptographic keys, increase the level of authentication, increase the strength of the cipher suite in use, or for any other reason. For the client to trigger a renegotiation, it is sufficient for it to send a new Client Hello message (in the encrypted channel, like any other handshaking message). The server responds with a Server Hello, and negotiation goes exactly as above. The server may also initiate a renegotiation by sending to the client a Hello Request message. The client then simply sends a new Client Hello, exactly as above, and the process goes as usual.

Each TLS negotiation results in an established TLS session with an assigned Session ID. TLS allows for session resumption, wherein the client specifies a Session ID from a previous session. Session resumption can save the server time and CPU by obviating the need to do a full cryptographic initialization (together with its attendant computational costs). It is important to note that session resumption seems to have been designed as an optimization, not as a security-related feature of the system.

Specific Problems

Scenario: Client certificate authentication

HTTPS servers which can be configured to provide client certificate authentication generally allow it to be configured on a per-directory basis. (It appears that Microsoft IIS defaults to this configuration. At the time of this writing, it can only be changed through a manual metabase edit.) This implies that the server cannot insist that the client provide a valid certificate until it has received the request from the client and filtered it through its authentication rules.

For requests that are found to require client certificate authentication, the HTTPS server must then renegotiate the TLS channel to obtain and validate the certificate from the client. If the certificate is found to be valid the server is then obligated to process the request.

Unfortunately, because HTTP lacks a specific response code to instruct the client to resubmit the request within the newly authenticated channel, the server must apply the authentication retroactively to the original request. Even though there is no gap in the encryption (negotiation of the new keys is conducted under the protection of the old), there is a loss of continuity in the authentication of the server to the client. This "authentication gap" is the central weakness exploited by these attacks.

In the absence of session resumption, there is no significant cryptographic state carried
over from the initial client connection to the renegotiated session. None of the HTTPS clients or servers tested were observed to conduct session resumption during renegotiation (much less require it, as it is an optional part of the protocol). In fact, resumption is designed purely as an optimization for resuming a previous cryptographic context, whereas renegotiation is designed to begin a new cryptographic context. In that sense, the two operations were designed for orthogonal purposes.

This attack has been demonstrated against recent versions of Apache httpd and Microsoft IIS, with a variety of clients.

Scenario: Differing server cryptographic requirements

HTTPS servers that host resources with varying cipher suite requirements may be vulnerable to another renegotiation attack. Because of the variations in the level of cipher suite strength, the web server has to be willing to negotiate TLS at the most basic encryption level supported on the server. Only after having seen the URL requested by the client can the server accurately determine which cipher suites will be acceptable.

If the current cipher suite is not one of the required cipher suites, the server must request a renegotiation and agree on new parameters. The act of soliciting client renegotiation triggers the same weakness as in the case of client certificates: the server is forced to replay the buffered request, which in this case includes the chosen plaintext of the attacker.

Of course, the attack depends on tricking the client into authenticating the transaction requested by the MITM. One way this can be done is via “request splicing”, i.e., having the man-in-the-middle splice two requests onto the beginning of the client’s intended communication. The first is a request to any (perhaps unrelated) resource that triggers renegotiation, and the second request is the injected attack, ending with a custom “ignore” header prefix (lacking line termination). This ignore header causes the first request line from the client, the HTTP request line, to be effectively “commented out” by the ignore header, and therefore ignored by the server. The remaining headers are automatically spliced onto the attacking request, including any Cookie or other authentication/authorization headers sent by the original client. This has the effect of authorizing the attacker’s request. The researchers suspect that most forms of HTTP authentication are susceptible.

One way to make this attack work in practice is to leverage the HTTP 1.1 pipelining and keep-alive facilities. This allows the attacker to submit both requests in a single segment, ahead of the triggered renegotiation. An example MITM-generated request buffer looks like this:

```c
char *req =
    "GET /highsecurity/index.html HTTP/1.1\r\n"
    "Host: example.com\r\n"
    "Connection: keep-alive\r\n"
    "\r\n"
```
The client then completes the second request with his own request:

```c
char *originalRequest =
  "GET /good.html HTTP/1.1\r\n";
```

The net effect looks like this to the server:

```
GET /highsecurity/index.html HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Connection: keep-alive

GET /evil/do.php?evilStuff=here HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Connection: close
X-ignore-what-comes-next: GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
Cookie: AuthMe=Now
...
```

**Scenario: Client-initiated renegotiation**

TLS equally allows the client side of the connection to initiate a renegotiation. This case is perhaps more attractive to the attacker because he does not need to elicit a Hello Request from the server, so no particular server-side configuration is required for this attack to succeed.

In the HTTPS domain, a practical attack involves the MITM splicing an initial request with an un-terminated HTTP “ignore” header onto the beginning of the client's intended request, again stealing whatever authentication or authorization information provided. Note that this does not require pipelining or HTTP keep-alive. In all other respects, the server sees the same sort of request buffer as above.

This attack has been tested and found to work against a current Apache. See the appendix for an illustrative trace.

**Implications**

The theoretical impact of this issue is potentially significant. To the extent that a compliant implementation of TLS allows an attacker to inject arbitrary plaintext into an authenticated session, it violates a core assumption made by application developers and protocol designers.
Most existing installations which currently rely on client certificates for authentication appear to be vulnerable.

Shared hosting environments which allow untrusted customers served from the same IP to configure any aspect of their encryption parameters appear to be vulnerable.

Most or all server applications built on TLS implementations which honor client-initiated renegotiation are vulnerable.

**Mitigation**

There seem to be few silver bullets to address these issues. Generally, they seem to have arisen due to incomplete or vague specifications of the interactions between TLS and application protocols (particularly HTTP), and sometimes because there were simply no alternatives.

Mitigation of the HTTPS client certificate attacks is difficult and involves tradeoffs. One possible solution is to require client certificate presentation immediately, before the presentation of the HTTP request to the server. While perhaps feasible, the implementation of this feature by common web server software is inconsistent - while the certificate may be prompted for, the client may in some cases simply refuse to respond with a valid certificate. In those cases, the server may fall back to the vulnerable behavior. This change also has the side effect of transmitting the client certificate chain in the clear, whereas previously it was protected within the first encrypted session.

From a broader perspective, though, that strategy has problems. For one thing, web servers often host content with varying certificate authentication requirements. One subdirectory might be the "secure" area of the site, requiring client certificate authentication, while another area may be an "anonymous" area such as a landing page. Simply requiring every visitor to the site to supply a valid client certificate may be impossible, since it completely prevents public viewing of the site. Even presenting visitors with the option of supplying client certificate authentication for every visit to the site is likely to be unacceptable from an user interaction perspective. One scenario for mitigation involves web developers reorganizing their sites to strictly separate areas of each site into zones based on their differing requirements for authentication, with zones being served from distinct IP addresses. One can imagine the high costs of such a transition, although there are ways to partially or fully automate this separation.

Other mitigations involve protocol changes, but again, they generally have their own issues. In some cases, compatibility with old client software is broken completely. For example, the server could require session ID resumption across renegotiations, but that would represent a breaking protocol change and introduce an incompatibility with most, if not all, current client software. It is unclear whether resumption is even technically allowed (by the current standard) during renegotiation and in practice it has not been
observed by the researchers.

The right long-term solution to the renegotiation problem involves a much more careful binding between TLS and upper protocol layers. This could be handled in a variety of ways, including breaking and backwards-compatible changes.

Cipher suite upgrade attacks can be minimized in a few ways. One obvious way is to require all content on a site to use a single cipher suite. Disallowing specification of TLS parameters in .htaccess files (generally modifiable by end users) may also be a good idea.

Clients need to be improved to take into account the things learned during this research. For one thing, browsers' behavior of allowing automatic certificate sending is suspect and should be reconsidered. Secondly, browsers suffer from a fundamental inability to authenticate the specific transaction the server is about to execute, ostensibly on behalf of the client. That underlying problem should be addressed, and will likely involve either a protocol change or changes in the way existing protocols are implemented.

Finally, it may make sense to require clients to authenticate servers using the supplied certificate before handing client certificates back to the server. This will effectively prevent the chosen-server attack scenarios described above. This may also represent a breaking protocol change, however, and is being investigated.

Next Steps

During the process of investigating these issues, the researchers ran across a number of additional areas that merit further work. Judging from recent experience, it is anticipated that the problem domain will continue to evolve in the coming weeks.

Development continues on effective exploitation techniques for some of the more difficult cases. These cases include refinements to the request splicing technique described above to better accommodate POST requests authenticated by HTTP headers.

Early research suggests that digital certificates embedded on smart cards are equally vulnerable to the client certificate authentication attacks. The researchers hypothesize that the fact that the certificate is embedded on a smart card offers no protection for these weaknesses at the protocol level.

Another promising area of investigation is cross-protocol exploitation. An exploit scenario might go like this: client (victim) opens his web browser, which automatically requests his homepage via HTTP. MITM edits the response to embed an invisible image linked to the https site to be attacked. The client browser then makes a request to the chosen site, the MITM intercepts it, and the attack proceeds as above. Aiding the attack are common client browser settings allowing the browser to provide client certificates silently in cases where there appears to be a reasonable default choice. This
would lead to a virtually automatic exploitation of an unsuspecting end user. Because any server can be compromised simply by a well-meaning user navigating to that server, this could be used by the operator of a hostile network as a way to attack a server on a remote network (all without the user's knowledge).

TLS includes a 64-bit sequence number which begins at zero and increments with every transmitted record. Implementations are required to perform a renegotiation before it is allowed to wrap. Although this is unlikely to be a practical attack, one can imagine that some implementations of TLS may renegotiate well in advance of approaching this limit. In any case, the ability of an attacker to trigger renegotiation via this mechanism would have similar consequences to those described above.

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**Appendix: client-initiated renegotiation support in Apache 2.2.3**

Following is output from OpenSSL's s_client test program, pointed to a stock Debian Apache 2.2.3 server. Note the line with the single “R” initiates a renegotiation, and the following line RENEGOTIATING was emitted by the s_client program to indicate that a renegotiation was in process. Note also that it successfully occurs before the HTTP headers are terminated. After the renegotiation is complete, the final newline is sent, causing the response to be sent.

```
Plato:~ dispensa$ openssl s_client -connect dispensas.com:443 -cipher EXP-RC4-MD5
CONNECTED(00000003)
...(certificate verification process trimmed)...  
GET / http/1.0
X-ignore-me: GET /
R
RENEGOTIATING
...(certificate verification process trimmed)...  
read R BLOCK
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2009 14:23:07 GMT
```
The client-initiated attack appears to work between a **wget** client and OpenSSL's simple web server: